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ABSTRACT
Objective: The overarching question addressed in this article
is: what has been the impact of economic evidence to Cana-
dian drug reimbursement decisions; within this, has an
(explicit or implicit) threshold been identiﬁed for making
such decisions; and is the impact or threshold different for
oncology medications?
Methods: Three sequential strategies were employed: a lit-
erature search, a review of publicly available Canadian reim-
bursement recommendations, and a one-day key informant
roundtable, held with a purposive sample of 13 individuals
from across Canada to gain information not readily acces-
sible from the public domain.
Results: Despite the formal requirement for structured eco-
nomic evidence, the limited public information suggests that
its uptake in the Canadian decision-making process has been
tentative. Implicit economic thresholds have been published
in Australia and the United Kingdom, but not in Canada.
Based on reviews of reimbursement recommendations,
thresholds speciﬁc to oncology medications may be higher
than for nononcology medications, in Canada and elsewhere.
Canadian reimbursement recommendations can appear
inconsistent with respect to clinical evidence, economic evi-
dence, and nonevidentiary factors, possibly because of a lack
of transparency or context-sensitive interpretations. The key
informant roundtable provided reasons for the inconsistent
uptake of economic evidence: panelists were divided between
those who found economic information useful and support-
ive to decision-making, and those who did not. Panelists
generally agreed on the need for publicly defensible and
ethical reimbursement restrictions. They suggested the fol-
lowing improvements: transparency of processes and deci-
sions, dynamic formularies that can adapt with evolving
treatment practices and clinical data, broader representation
of expertise on review panels, greater use of ethics to resolve
conﬂicts arising from different perspectives, and the develop-
ment of an explicit Canadian weighting system for evidence
and values.
Conclusions: Economic evidence has been tentatively incor-
porated in reimbursement decision-making in Canada. Public
reasons for recommendation indicate that this evidence is
used primarily with respect to the attractiveness of an incre-
mental cost-effectiveness ratio. Oncology drugs seem to be
adopted at the highest thresholds of acceptability. Yet,
decision-makers expressed a need to move beyond lambda,
rejecting the simplicity of the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio and considering alternative strategies to improve
decision-making, including formal guidance for weighting
both evidence and values.
Keywords: decision-making, economic threshold, oncology
drugs, reimbursement.
Introduction
Innovative pharmaceuticals can greatly improve health
outcomes, but increasingly constrain available
resources [1]. To conduct reimbursement decision-
making with credibility and accountability, centralized
drug review agencies have been established in many
countries, including Canada [2]. Nevertheless, there is a
worry among patients (and often, clinicians) that the
reimbursement review process might delay or impede
access to new effectivemedications. For life-threatening
diseases with rapidly evolving treatments such as
cancer, this is seen to be particularly problematic [1]. In
support of this concern, there is well-documented
inconsistency of reimbursement decisions and drug
access across Canada, for both nononcology [3–5] and
oncology [6] medications. Canada’s centralized review
process for outpatient medications was expected to
mitigate access inconsistency. To date, this has been
hindered by slow and/or limited uptake by several
provinces [7]. Infused oncology medications have
recently been converted to a Canadian centralized
review process aswell [8]. Thiswasmotivated at least in
part bymedia attention aimed at high proﬁle, expensive
oncology medications, which resulted in their funding
approval by politicians without the completion of the
standard review process [9].
Cost-effectiveness data are formally required by
many reimbursement review agencies; in Canada, they
have been required for all new outpatient medications
Address correspondence to: Angela Rocchi, AXIA Research Inc.,
181 Main Street West, Hamilton, ON, Canada L8P 4S1. E-mail:
angela@axiaresearch.com
10.1111/j.1524-4733.2007.00298.x
Volume 11 • Number 4 • 2008
V A L U E I N H E A LT H
© 2007, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) 1098-3015/08/771 771–783 771
since 1996 [10,11]. The preferred economic measure is
the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), calcu-
lated by dividing difference in costs by the difference in
quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). There have been
suggestions that decision-making bodies have explicit
or implicit thresholds for the ICER above which health
interventions (including medications) will not be reim-
bursed [12–15]. The threshold value of the ICER is
referred to as lambda (l), a variable which can take on
different values in different situations, and change with
time [16]. Practically, lambda depends on the value
decision-makers place on the good or service that they
are purchasing in any given situation. There are con-
cerns that cost-effectiveness data have been misinter-
preted, with ICERs below a given lambda used to
justify increasing and unsustainable expenditures
while ignoring opportunity costs [16–18]. Given
Canada’s long-standing requirement for economic evi-
dence, one might expect that both the role of cost-
effectiveness data and the ICER threshold would be
well developed in Canada.
Despite the existence of a single universal public
health-care system in Canada, pharmaceuticals fall
under a mosaic of payers. Provincial governments pay
for outpatient medications for a variable beneﬁciary
population, ranging from seniors and those on social
assistance to entire provincial populations. Private
drug plans and individual patients cover the remaining
outpatient drug use. Hospitals are responsible for
funding inpatient medications. Infused oncology
agents are generally funded by provincial cancer agen-
cies, or individual hospitals. Outpatient oncology
agents fall under the mix of outpatient payers (public,
private, or cash payment). In 2003, the Common Drug
Review (CDR) was established as a central review
agency for new outpatient medications (including out-
patient [oral] oncology medications). CDR explicitly
considers cost-effectiveness in the review by its Cana-
dian Expert Drug Advisory Committee (CEDAC) [11].
In 2007, an initial Joint Oncology Drug Review
(JODR) process was established to act as a centralized
review for infused oncology agents. Given the multi-
tude of payers both historically and currently, oncol-
ogy medications have been exposed to a unique variety
of decision-making bodies and processes, each of
which may have different views of economic evidence
or thresholds of value. Moreover, it is hypothesized
that oncology medications may have a higher ICER
threshold for acceptability than nononcology medica-
tions, facilitated by their separate funding process.
The overarching question addressed in this paper is:
what has been the impact of economic evidence to
Canadian oncology drug reimbursement decisions;
within this, has an (explicit or implicit) threshold been
identiﬁed for making such decisions; and is the impact
or threshold different for oncology medications? This
was achieved by: 1) a review of published literature
on reimbursement decision-making in Canada; 2) a
review of published reasons for reimbursement recom-
mendations made by Canada’s CDR; and 3) a key
informant roundtable, to gain information outside of
the public domain. The reviews of published evidence
included both nononcology medications as well as
oncology medications, to broaden the evidence base
and to provide a comparison to oncology medications.
Methods
Three sequential research methods were employed.
Literature Review
A search was conducted using multiple databases
(PubMed, Econlit, PAIS, NHS Economic Evaluation
Database, HealthSTAR, Scopus, TRIP, Tufts-NEMC
CEA Registry, and CODECS). The focus was to iden-
tify recent articles that discussed the use of economic
evaluations and ICER thresholds for reimbursement
decision-making (for all medications, and oncology
medications in particular). Articles that examined
Canadian processes of evaluation and assessment for
medications were also reviewed. A 5-year period was
chosen for currency of information. PubMed search
terms included: Canada, oncology or cancer AND
reimbursement, decision-making, threshold, drug or
central review process, and priority setting. Econlit
terms included: model construction and estimation,
analysis of health-care markets, allocative efﬁciency,
cost-beneﬁt analysis, cost effectiveness, health, analysis
of health-care markets, government policy, regulation,
public health, technological change: choices and con-
sequences, diffusion processes, UK, health care, health,
technology, and technologies. References from relevant
articles were also scanned. In total, 85 references were
obtained and reviewed, from 489 articles identiﬁed.
Potential articles were scanned by one author (AR);
relevant articles were reviewed by all authors.
Review of CEDAC Recommendations
An important part of the public evidence for both the
use of cost-effectiveness analyses and the existence of
thresholds are the published reimbursement decisions.
In Canada, both the advisory boards for the CDR
(CEDAC) and the province of Quebec (the Conseil du
Médicaments) post their recommendations, and the
reasons for their recommendations, on their web sites.
All of the CEDAC published recommendations were
reviewed, from September 2003 (inception of the
CDR) to the end of March 2007. Recommendations
were reviewed and categorized by two authors (AR,
EM); interpretations were discussed by all authors. If
an ICER was reported, or if “cost-effectiveness” or
“economic model” was mentioned in the reasons for
recommendation, then these medications were catego-
rized as those for which economic evidence went
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beyond price identiﬁcation. Submissions regarding
oncology medications were noted separately. CEDAC
recommendations were selected because the committee
is explicitly charged to consider cost-effectiveness;
there is a national impact and the mandate is for public
drug plans (as are oncology medications). Quebec is
the only other jurisdiction which publishes its reasons
for recommendation; however, cost-effectiveness evi-
dence had not been a formal requirement for Quebec
formulary submissions; the decisions have a mixed
payer jurisdiction (both public and hospital), and they
are limited in accessibility (published only in French).
Based on the literature and CEDAC review, a posi-
tion paper was prepared to summarize the ﬁndings,
offer interpretations, and develop a list of questions to
be addressed by the roundtable.
Key Informant Roundtable
A purposive sample of 17 individuals from across
Canada were invited to participate in a one-day key
informant roundtable to examine the factors that
impact reimbursement decision-making in oncology
and the value of lambda. The panel was comprised of
experts who are currently involved in oncology reim-
bursement decision-making (cancer board members,
expert review board members, drug plan administra-
tors) as well as those who could be involved, but
typically are not (patients, ethicists, and health eco-
nomists). Members were generally known to the
co-authors and were purposely selected to represent
different viewpoints, regions in Canada, types of insti-
tutions (academic, institution, consumer), and types of
expertise. Panelists were offered identical honoraria
and all expenses for attending the roundtable meeting
were covered.
The ﬁnal panel included 13 individuals: three
oncologists (two of whom sit on provincial cancer
boards), three pharmacists (all of whom sit on provin-
cial cancer boards), two provincial drug plan advisory
board members (one physician, one pharmacist), two
health economics/health policy specialists, an ethicist,
and two patients. Two provincial drug plan managers
and two members of CEDAC were invited, but did not
attend. Provincial cancer board members, provincial
advisory board members, and CEDAC members can
be considered de facto decision-makers. Although
technically these boards offer “recommendations,”
with the ﬁnal decisions made by the Ministries of
Health, board chairs repeatedly comment that recom-
mendations are almost always accepted, with only
occasional intervention from top-level government
ofﬁcials.
The panel was asked to address questions covering
both the evidentiary basis required for new cancer
medications, and important considerations that go
beyond these evidentiary requirements (Table 1).
Questions on the evidentiary basis covered clinical,
health economic, and budget impact information.
Non-evidentiary factors included equity, the role of
precedents, rule of rescue, the ethics and law that
should guide decision-making, the role of stakehold-
ers, the composition of decision-making committees,
and the impact of a separate process for oncology
medications. Before the meeting, these topics were
Table 1 Key questions for roundtable
Factors Questions
Evidentiary factors for decision-making in oncology
Clinical evidence
Preferred outcomes Is overall survival a preferred outcome? Is there a hierarchy of outcomes?
Should outcomes always be converted to QALYs?
Extent of beneﬁt Is there a minimum clinically important difference for survival?
For other outcomes?
Data limitations Is it acceptable to extrapolate when the trial evidence is less than ideal?
Examples: surrogate outcomes to ﬁnal outcomes, application to nontrial populations,
application to nontrial clinical settings, indirect comparisons with nontrial comparators?
Economic evidence
Thresholds Is the acceptability of an ICER affected by context?
Drug factors Do these factors affect ICER acceptability: innovative drug, few active comparators,
substantial beneﬁt, curative therapy?
Disease factors Do these factors affect ICER acceptability: high morbidity, high mortality, high prevalence,
high proﬁle?
Budget impact analysis
Affordability Is the standard of evidence higher for drugs with a larger budget impact?
Does this discriminate against prevalent diseases?
Appropriate utilization Does the ability to achieve appropriate utilization affect the reimbursement decision?
Nonevidentiary factors
Equity Are all health gains equivalent, or are some valued more than others?
Historical precedent Do past reimbursement decisions impact future decisions?
Multiple processes Should there be a different process for oncology drugs? How are decisions affected
by the fact that infusional drugs are not available outside of the public system?
Composition of panels Who should sit on decision-making panels for oncology drugs?
ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
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identiﬁed, pretested, and revised. Interview questions
were posed in an open-ended, semistructured format.
A professional facilitator organized the discussions
and took ﬁeld notes throughout the day on a ﬂip chart,
which were viewable and corrected as needed by the
participants. This was supplemented by detailed ﬁeld
notes recorded by two authors (EM, AR). Notes were
analyzed and emerging themes were identiﬁed using
the grounded theory approach [19]. Theoretical frame-
works for the qualitative interpretation were decision
analysis, which outlines the risks and beneﬁts of com-
peting decisions, and accountability for reasonable-
ness, which is the dominant ethical framework for
legitimacy of decision-making in Canada [20]. Inter-
rater reliability was determined by circulating the
summary among the four authors for input and revi-
sion. Panelists were provided with the draft manu-
script and asked for feedback and further comments;
all input received was incorporated in the results in a
subsequent iteration.
Results
Literature Review
The use of economic information. Despite the formal
requirement for structured economic evidence, there is
little public information on how it is being used in
reimbursement decisions, in Canada and elsewhere,
either for oncology or for nononcology medications
[21]. Indeed, there is little Canadian public documen-
tation regarding the use of other requested forms of
evidence (clinical and budget impact information), or
the impact of nonevidentiary considerations. Evidence
is generally limited to experiences in a single province
(Ontario), and a single author has made several of
these contributions [22–25].
The literature on general drug reimbursement
decision-making shows that clinical evidence has been
considered of paramount importance; economic analy-
ses play a limited role, and complex economic models
do not offer additional value [22,26]. Historically, this
was attributed to a lack of health economic expertise
within review panels, and to the poor quality of the
economic analyses [22,26]. More recently, concerns
about quality continue to be raised relating to bias
in industry-sponsored economic research [27,28].
Surveys of provincial drug plans support that economic
evidence is more likely to play a role in decision-making
if the drug has a high budget impact, a marginal beneﬁt
but high cost, or is innovative [29]. Most recommenda-
tions reportedly do not hinge on the interpretation of
complicated economic models; more relevant issues are
considered to be lack of head-to-head trials, validity
and importance of surrogate markers, and inappropri-
ate (off-label) use [23,24]. Because economic evidence is
based on the clinical evidence, any clinical shortcom-
ings have a direct inﬂuence on the quality and impact of
the economic evidence. The Australian experience con-
ﬁrms this ﬁnding [30].
Published Canadian research on funding for new
cancer medications is minimal and indicates that cost-
effectiveness was not widely used in reimbursement
decision-making. A survey of cancer boards supports
the assertion that the most important sources of infor-
mation for formulary consideration were clinical
efﬁcacy trials, prospective effectiveness studies, and
justiﬁcation by the requesting physician [6]. Pharma-
coeconomic studies were rated only as somewhat
important. In an older review of the ﬁrst 3 years of
Cancer Care Ontario’s (CCO) Policy Advisory Com-
mittee for the New Drug Funding Program (1997–
2000), the authors stated that formal economic
evaluation was rarely available and never used; in all
cases, patient beneﬁt was the primary consideration
[31]. (Note: economic evaluations for infused oncol-
ogy medications are now formally considered in the
province of Ontario since 2005.) A qualitative study
conducted of CCO’s decisions similarly noted the
primacy of clinical evidence. It also noted that ration-
ales for priority setting could change, especially as
treatment costs increased; and that rationales involved
clusters of factors, and not simple trade-offs [32]. In
other words, decisions depended on speciﬁc circum-
stances, and each set of circumstances was unique.
Finally, public guidance on the collection and use of
economic evidence in oncology is provided by the
National Cancer Institute of Canada’s criteria that
economic data should be collected in clinical trials
where: the budget impact is high (either due to high
prevalence or high drug acquisition cost), the incre-
mental beneﬁt is modest, uncertainty exists regarding
economic impact, or similarly efﬁcacious treatments
may have different cost impact [33].
Cost-effectiveness thresholds in decision-making. The
Canadian literature on drug decision-making thresh-
olds dates back to 1992, when Laupacis et al. sug-
gested that CDN$20K (present-day CDN$24K)
should be the upper boundary for a recommenda-
tion to adopt a new technology, while CDN$100K
(present-day CDN$122K) should be the lower bound-
ary for a recommendation not to adopt an interven-
tion, leaving a broad gray area for adoption [25].
The anecdotal threshold is US$50K (present-day
CDN$114K), that purportedly represented the cost-
effectiveness of dialysis treatment for renal failure
patients in the United States at the time of its adoption
by Medicare in 1982 [34]. Notwithstanding, there is
no formal evidence that any of these boundaries has
ever been accepted or implemented by any Canadian
decision-making body, for oncology or nononcology
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medications. In fact, Laupacis has since stated that the
traditional $50K/QALY “would be considered rela-
tively unattractive” [22].
In contrast to the inconsistent uptake or even delib-
erate avoidance of a threshold in Canada, observations
of decisions by the centralized review agencies in both
the United Kingdom and Australia point to an appar-
ent threshold above which reimbursement has been
found to be exceedingly unlikely (2005 US$45.9K in
the United Kingdom [14] and US$52.4K in Australia
[15]).
Oncology-speciﬁc thresholds are emerging in the
literature. In a recent presentation, the current chair of
the Ontario expert review committee suggested that if
a $50K threshold were to exist for nononcology medi-
cations, the threshold for oncology medications might
be higher, at around $75K, because the clinical evi-
dence to support beneﬁt is often stronger for oncology
medications [35]. This corresponds with international
observations that the United Kingdom’s National
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has approved
more oncology medications at the upper bound of
acceptability than nononcology medications [36],
while in Scotland, oncology medications have exhib-
ited higher ICERs (on average, twice the level of
nononcology medications) with a similar rate of accep-
tance as nononcology medications [37]. These obser-
vations support that a higher threshold may exist for
oncology medications.
Review of CEDAC Recommendations
As part of the review of the public evidence, the
reasons for recommendation generated by CEDAC
were examined. These reasons should, in theory, iden-
tify the role of economic evidence and indicate whether
an implicit lambda was used. The authors examined
the recommendations of all 62 drug indications pro-
duced (up to March 2007). During this time, four
oncology medications were reviewed (because CDR’s
mandate is limited to medications administered in an
outpatient setting, most oncology medications [requir-
ing infusion in an institutional setting] do not qualify
for the CDR process). Particular attention was paid to
these four medications. It must be noted that the
reasons for recommendation are quite brief (one to one
and half pages) and the explanations are nonstandard-
ized, which both limits the data that can be analyzed
and broadens the potential for subjective interpreta-
tion of the reasons in a different manner than intended.
Table 2 presents the most common factors or criteria
that were mentioned in the reasons as affecting the
recommendation.
In 37 cases (60%), the only economic evidence men-
tioned was price (Fig. 1). For most of these cases
(81%), it was deemed that there was clinical equiva-
lence with at least one existing therapy which the CDR
deemed an appropriate comparator, and the decision
basis was simpliﬁed: recommend listing if the new
agent’s price was the same or less than available prod-
uct(s) (20 cases), and recommend not to list if it was
higher (10 cases). A formal economic evaluation pre-
sumably was not needed. In the remaining seven cases,
economic evidence was not considered relevant
because of the difﬁculties with establishing clinical efﬁ-
cacy or equivalent place in therapy.
Economic evidence beyond price seemed to be con-
sidered in less than half of the cases (25 out of 62
[40%]), including 12 negative recommendations and
13 positive recommendations. Unfortunately, ICERs
were not routinely reported. For rejected medications
where a formal economic evaluation was explicitly
considered, the economic evidence was often not con-
sidered helpful, usually because of overestimates of
clinical beneﬁt in the economic model. Medications
with a negative recommendation had a range of ICERs
(where stated) from $32K/QALY to $137K/QALY. For
the medications with a recommendation to list, there
was often no clear statement that any cost-effectiveness
criterion was met. The panel clearly indicated satisfac-
tion with the cost-effectiveness of four medications:
two cases of economic dominance (more effective, less
expensive), one case where a drug was described as
cost-effective when used after failure of other medica-
tions (with a stated ICER of $31K/QALY), and one
case where an ICER of $71K/life year gained (LYG)
was reported versus one comparator, and described as
“cost-effective” versus another comparator. In all of
these cases, the listing criteria were concordant with
the role in therapy established in the clinical trials. In
the remaining nine positive recommendations, the
ICERs ranged from $50K/QALY to $80K/QALY.
Table 2 Factors in CEDAC reasons for recommendation
Frequently cited factors
Clinical Type of outcome (surrogate, intermediate, ﬁnal)
Magnitude of beneﬁt versus comparators
Choice of comparator
Trial duration
Generalizability of trial population
Trial size
Comparative safety
Economic Price
Quality of model
Clinical beneﬁt used in model versus beneﬁt
observed in RCTs
ICER
Nonevidentiary Historical precedent
Noncited factors
Type of disease
Prevalence of disease
Equity
Rule of rescue
Lack of alternatives
Budget impact
Appropriateness of utilization
Innovative drug
CEDAC, Canadian Expert Drug Advisory Committee; ICER, incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio; RCT, randomized controlled trial.
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There was often no clear indication of whether the
panel found the ICER to be attractive or not attractive;
however, most of these positive recommendations had
listing criteria which were more strict than the clinical
trials (or approved labeling) or were recommended for
later use, after failure of established comparators. The
exceptions were the oncology drug sunitinib (discussed
later) and adalimumab for psoriatic arthritis, whose
ICER of $70K/QALY was described as “in excess of
traditional standards” but in line with other medica-
tions in its class. In the cases of adalimumab and
rituximab, both of which are very expensive agents,
historical precedence was invoked to justify the recom-
mendation (i.e., earlier medications in these classes
were listed by payers, and thus these later entrants
were recommended for listing as well). Paradoxically,
in other cases, historical precedent could have been but
was not consistently applied.
The four oncology medications made an interesting
subset, with two positive and two negative recommen-
dations. In chronological order, geﬁtinib was rejected
by CEDAC: because its regulatory approved was based
on phase II data, the panel stated that its effectiveness
could not be established, and thus its cost-effectiveness
could not be determined. Formal economic evidence,
however, was used in the other three medications
reviewed. Erlotinib was recommended for listing, with
an ICER versus docetaxel thatwas not reported butwas
described as “cost-effective,” and an ICER versus best
supportive care at $71K/LYG. More recently, sorafenib
was rejectedwith an ICERof $78K/LYGwhile sunitinib
was recommended for listing with an ICER of $80K/
QALY. ICERs for oncology medications constituted the
upper limit of ICERs associated with positive listing
recommendations. Nevertheless, there was an apparent
inconsistency in evaluating the evidence. First, there
was no clear economic threshold in place for these four
medications; further, the panel expressed the opinion
that the use of progression-free survival was not a valid
surrogate outcome for sorafenib’s indication (renal cell
cancer), but indicated no such concerns for sunitinib’s
indication (gastrointestinal stroma tumor).
Because the oncology drug subset was small, anti-
retrovirals (ARVs) for HIV disease were reviewed as
another therapeutic drug class intended for a patient
group with a life-threatening illness. Seven ARVs have
been reviewed by CEDAC, all of which have been
recommended for listing. Three medications fell into
the price-only category (abacavir/lamivudine, ataza-
navir, fosamprenavir). Formal economic evidence was
considered for four medications, and ICERs were
stated in the range of $31K/QALY to $52K/QALY.
These ICERs were substantially lower than the ICERs
for oncology medications, and were associated with
restriction criteria (patients who had failed less expen-
sive therapy).
CEDAC  Final 
Recommendations
Sep 2004 – Mar 2007
N = 62 
Economic Evidence 
Beyond Price 
N = 25 (40%) 
Economic Evidence 
Limited to Price 
N = 37 (60%) 
ICER Considered 
Attractive 
N = 4 (16%) 
ICER Not Considered 
Attractive 
N =21 (84%) 
Clinical Equivalency 
with Comparators 
N = 30 (81%) 
Unable to Determine
Efficacy/Equivalency
N = 7 (19%) 
Price ≤ Comparators:
N = 20 (67%) 
Price > Comparators: 
N = 10 (33%) 
List
N = 4 (100%) 
ICER Range:
dominant to 
$71K/LYG
List
N = 9 (43%) 
ICER Range:  $50K 
to $80K/QALY 
Do Not List 
N = 12 (57%) 
ICER Range:
$32K/QALY to 
$137K/QALY
Do Not List 
N = 7 (100%) 
List
N = 20 (100%) 
Do Not List 
N = 10 (100%) 
Figure 1 CEDAC recommendations. CEDAC, Canadian Expert Drug Advisory Committee; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; LYG, life year
gained; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
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Key Informant Roundtable
Discussion from the key informant roundtable roughly
followed the order described in Table 1, and main
themes are presented in Box 1. Critical issues which
occurred repeatedly were: 1) the divisiveness of the
panel regarding the role of economic evidence and
thresholds; 2) the ethical conﬂicts in decision-making
that necessarily ensue based on perspective; 3) the need
to ensure legitimacy and support for the decision-
maker; and 4) the current lack but need for an explicit
weighting system for values and evidence to guide
decisions which are consistent, defensible, and reﬂec-
tive of Canadian values.
Use of economic evidence and thresholds. The use
of economic evidence in decision-making provoked
strong disagreement among the participants. Addition-
ally, signiﬁcant interjurisdictional differences in
process, expertise, and values were uncovered as were
differences in the valuation of evidence and noneviden-
tiary factors. Differences in ethical views depended on
the perspective of the decision-maker (societal, institu-
tional, or individual).
Two distinct viewpoints emerged on the role of
health economics in decision-making. The majority of
participants thought that economic evidence contrib-
uted to decision-making. Clinical evidence was con-
sidered more important, but economic evidence was
accepted as additional supportive information, and an
alternative way of exploring and representing clinical
beneﬁt. Participants noted that health economics had a
more important role to play in some decisions than
in others. It was sometimes useful to identify which
populations beneﬁted the most, or to compare
resource allocation across a variety of medications. It
was considered less useful if the clinical data were
weak or of low quality, because the economic data
would then also be poor.
Box 1
Summary of roundtable positions
Use of economic evidence
Majority position: economic evidence has a role in decision-making, supportive to the clinical evidence.
Minority position: economic evidence is misused, abused, and not helpful to decision-making.
Existence of thresholds
Majority positions: the focus on a single measure (the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio) was detrimental;
the simplistic use of a threshold for value was rejected.
Use of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs)
Majority position: QALYs are not ideal but it is necessary to have a common denominator.
Minority position: aggregate measures including QALYs should not be used until they are broadly validated
by community preferences.
Need for reimbursement limits
Majority position: there is a need to address budget concerns by restricting access to new drugs based on
clinically appropriate and cost-effective utilization.
Minority positions: patients should be able to access all potentially beneﬁcial therapies; drug budgets
increases are unsustainable and should be avoided, not justiﬁed.
Ethical conﬂicts in decision-making
Majority position: there is a conﬂict in decision-making based on perspective (patient, institution, or
government); the failure to acknowledge this conﬂict creates problems including potential media manipu-
lation and reduced legitimacy for the decision-maker.
Weighting system for values and evidence
Majority position: there should be a weighting system for evidence, and a weighting system for values, to
ensure consistency, fairness, and legitimacy of decision-making, as well as to ensure that decisions reﬂect
Canadian societal values.
Separate process for oncology
Majority position: oncology drugs should have a similar reimbursement review process as nononcology
drugs, but with oncology-speciﬁc expertise on the review panel.
Minority position: oncology has suffered from having a separate review process.
Composition of reimbursement review panels
Majority position: oncology and nononcology panels should have expertise across a variety of ﬁelds: clinical
experts, methodology experts, ethicists, patients, the lay public, and government.
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A minority of participants strongly expressed the
view that economic evidence was misused, abused, and
useless to the decision-making process. Diverse reasons
for this view were posited including: cost-effectiveness
thresholds justify unaffordable budget expansion
instead of efﬁcient allocation of existing resources;
“health economics is promoted by a self-serving
group of doers”; decision-makers, governments, and
politicians do not understand health economics; and
health economics seeks simplistically to “summarize
complex questions into a single number (the ICER)
and a single metric (the QALY).” With respect to the
QALY, a majority of panelists agreed that aggregate
outcome measures such as the QALY were “necessary
evils”—it was thought to be useful to have a single
metric for combining quality and quantity of life,
which could be used across diseases, even though pan-
elists generally agreed that the QALY is not an ideal
measure. A minority argued against the QALY (or any
other aggregate measure) because it involves a numeri-
cal valuation of health states that has not been broadly
validated by the general Canadian population. Fur-
thermore, there was little consensus among partici-
pants on other appropriate clinical outcomes or the use
of disaggregated outcomes (e.g., a focus on survival
can prejudice decisions against palliative or supportive
care interventions).
Virtually all panelists, even those supportive of
economic evidence, were clear that “the focus on a
single outcome [the QALY] and a single measure [the
ICER] for the reimbursement decision is detrimental.”
It was clearly stated that economic evidence does not
dictate or predict the reimbursement decision, but
instead can be one of several pieces of information
that contribute to the decision. It was further specu-
lated by one panelist that the setting of a threshold
would simply result in biasing analyses not to exceed
the threshold. Overall, panelists rejected the idea of a
uniform threshold for value, because some interven-
tions with low ICERs could be rightly rejected for
reimbursement, while others with higher ICERs could
be justiﬁably considered (under favorable circum-
stances: such as, cancer medications with substantial
survival beneﬁt). Finally, it was repeatedly noted that
any positive ICER, no matter how appealing, repre-
sents additional spending which may not be afford-
able or sustainable.
Beyond evidence. Discussions from the roundtable
meeting were wide-ranging beyond the original ques-
tion of how evidentiary and nonevidentiary factors
inﬂuence lambda and the reimbursement decision.
These additional discussions are presented here,
because they address the underlying issue of how reim-
bursement decisions are currently made, and how they
could be improved. Often, panelists voiced these con-
cerns using the “accountability for reasonableness”
ethical framework as a means to ensure legitimacy of
the decision-maker.
The ethical conﬂicts of decision-making were
repeatedly acknowledged by panelists: they noted that
decision-making tasks are complex, and despite best
efforts, it is difﬁcult to reconcile competing interests. It
was stated at the outset by the ethicist that decisions
must be informed by an “ethics of complexity”:
general ethical principles must be applied and it must
be recognized that each decision is unique, multifacto-
rial, and must be considered in context. Panelists
agreed that there is a need for timely access to new
medicines, as an important goal of our health-care
system. Conversely, it was acknowledged that deci-
sions about access also require consideration of
reimbursement limits. Panelists concluded that reim-
bursement restrictions are most supportable when they
are transparent and consistent across the country, and
when they foster sustainable population health, by
recognizing a public program’s priorities and ﬁscal
constraints “while giving due weight to the rights and
claims of individuals who seek treatment.” It was
noted that “when the good of the community and that
of particular individuals are in conﬂict, ethics requires
that we can justify not honouring the claims that are
not fulﬁlled.” Panelists shared the feeling that accep-
tance of reimbursement decisions can be fostered by
demonstrating that the process has been fair and has
been followed by appropriate decision-makers and
informed by ethical considerations. It was suggested
that currently “there is a refusal to acknowledge the
ethical conﬂict.” As a result, even decision-makers
who feel clearly that they should represent the general
societal good ﬁnd it extremely troublesome to make
decisions that will undoubtedly cause individual harm.
Panelists found that the genuine hardship imposed
on individual patients results in emotional pleading
through the media and to politicians, which under-
mines support for the decision-maker.
The panelists concluded that equity is not consis-
tently addressed in decisions about cancer medica-
tions: although this is rarely acknowledged, not all
health gains are valued equally. For example, panel-
ists acknowledged that health gains in children are
valued more highly as are health gains in serious dis-
eases. Some changes in health status are also pre-
ferred (such as, an improvement from a dysfunctional
to a functional health state, rather than from a good
to a very good health state). Nevertheless, there are
no clear rules outlining which health gains are
preferred.
Participants claimed that a structured and consistent
weighting system for evidence and values needs to be
developed. This means, for example, agreeing on a
hierarchy of health gains and/or diseases in terms of
whichmerit additional funding over others. To enhance
acceptability and sustainability, “these values must be
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revealed by society rather than imposed on it.” Panelists
were concerned that in the absence of stated values,
decisions may appear inconsistent, unjustiﬁable, and
unacceptable. Although health-care funding addresses
social values as well as health, the panel felt that we as
a society are not explicit about those values. We need to
be clearer about the use of health-care funding to be
consistent with these values. An example of this issue
was posed in the question: if we cannot afford to treat
everyone, should we try to treat some, or none?
Similarly, the panel acknowledged the importance
of a structured and consistent weighting scheme for
evidence (see Table 1 for examples of these factors).
Currently, it was perceived that evidence is valued in
an inconsistent and context-sensitive manner. More-
over, the panel felt that evidence is usually limited
because regulatory informational requirements are not
as demanding as reimbursement requirements, and it
is generally necessary to extrapolate or generalize
beyond the known data. This is particularly acute in
the area of oncology, where early adoption based on
interim data from conference proceedings is common.
Data extrapolation was discussed, and was considered
both inevitable and acceptable under the following
circumstances: “when it is evidence-based, done in a
narrow sense and within biologically plausible
ranges.” Participants stated that “data sources may
need to be more diverse for reimbursement decision-
making and move beyond randomized controlled
trials.” Currently, nontrial data and data extrapola-
tions have a low value among decision-makers. Even
with an evidence value structure, panelists believed
that there would continue to be variance in physician
and patient risk/beneﬁt tolerance, with respect to offer-
ing or accepting therapy. This situation occurs fre-
quently in the oncology setting, where uptake often
precedes regulatory approval or publication of full
trial results.
Participants identiﬁed the need for consistency of
the process over time, but not necessarily uniformity of
decisions. Panelists stated that the primary means to
demonstrate consistency is transparency, that is, to
explain how seemingly different decisions are reached
by different groups or at different times. Geographic
inconsistency is problematic but is recognized as a
function of the provincially operated Canadian system.
The participants shared a common view on the
decision-making process for oncology medications;
that is, the oncology drug review process should be the
same as for other medications. A subgroup of panelists
believed that “oncology has suffered from having a
separate process,” because they perceived that “the
standard of evidence is higher for oncology medica-
tions,” and constraints on funding decisions have been
more stringent.
Panelists also shared a common view that the com-
position of oncology review panels should be similar to
nononcology review panels, while including appropri-
ate oncology expertise and knowledge. All reimburse-
ment decision-making panels were thought to require
the following: speciﬁc clinical experts (physicians,
nurses, and pharmacists), methodological experts
(health economists, biostatisticians, and clinical epide-
miologists), public representatives, patient representa-
tives, government (drug plan managers), and ethicists.
All agreed that patients should be included in these
panels to reﬂect the general patient experience, but
participants felt that it was not necessary to include
speciﬁc disease advocates for the drug under review.
Discussion
The three data collection methods contributed differ-
ent and complementary information to the questions
of whether Canadian oncology reimbursement
decision-makers consider economic evidence, whether
a threshold of acceptability exists, and whether these
are different for oncology drugs. While economic evi-
dence has been tentatively incorporated in reimburse-
ment decision-making (particularly for oncology
medications), its uptake has been considerably accel-
erated recently. Public reasons for recommendation
indicate that this evidence is used primarily with
respect to the attractiveness of an ICER. Oncology
medications seem to be adopted at the highest thresh-
olds of acceptability. Yet, decision-makers expressed
the importance of moving beyond lambda, rejecting
the simplicity of the ICER and considering alternative
strategies to improve decision-making, including
formal guidance for weighting both evidence and
values.
The literature review was limited by a relative lack
of Canadian publications, compared to the volume of
literature that has developed in the United Kingdom
and especially surrounding NICE. Because the CDR is
a relatively new process, there has been little opportu-
nity for systematic reviews or commentary. The estab-
lishment of the CDR has changed the landscape of
reimbursement decision-making in Canada. Even more
recently, oncology drug review has been overhauled
with the establishment in April 2007 of the JODR,
intended as a national parallel process to CDR for
reimbursement review and decision-making for
oncology medications. Literature pertaining to previ-
ous practices may now be outdated. On the other
hand, many of the same key individuals continue to
be involved in reimbursement decision-making; for
example, Laupacis et al. published several key articles
describing reimbursement decision-making in Ontario
and became the ﬁrst chair of the CEDAC [22–25].
Moreover, the Ontario decision-making process has
been adopted as the starting process for the JODR.
This suggests that key learnings and observations from
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older processes may be carried forward into newer
processes.
The key ﬁnding of the literature review was that the
uptake of structured economic evidence in the Cana-
dian decision-making process has been tentative over
much of the previous years, for both oncology and
nononcology medications. In particular, there has been
an aversion to complex economic models possibly
because of a shortage of health economic experts on
decision-making panels. There is an appropriate domi-
nance of clinical evidence, and an unwillingness to
approve medications in the face of clinical uncertainty
arising from inevitable phase III trial limitations (short
duration, selective population, small sample size, sur-
rogate outcomes). Decision-makers appear resistant to
resolving clinical uncertainty with the use of economic
modeling [38]. Possibly because of the context-
sensitive nature of the evidence and local decision-
making goals or practices, there is a resulting
heterogeneity of access to both oncology and nonon-
cology medications in Canada, underlining an incon-
sistency in decision-making. This is popularly thought
to run counter to the principles of Canada’s universal
public health-care system. Finally, while implicit
thresholds have been acknowledged in the literature
for Australia and the United Kingdom, there has been
no recognition of a threshold or even the validity of a
threshold in the Canadian literature, for either oncol-
ogy or nononcology medications. Thresholds need to
be nation-speciﬁc, as they depend on a nation’s ability
to pay for health care and on a society’s willingness to
pay for health care in place of other goods and services
[39].
In contrast, the recommendations of the CEDAC
have provided substantive evidence for how and when
economic evidence is currently used, and whether a
threshold exists. Others have noted patterns in
CEDAC recommendations, speciﬁcally that biologi-
cally similar (me-too) medications for common dis-
eases are almost always recommended for funding,
while innovative medications or medications for rare
diseases are not [40]. This review also found that bio-
logically similar medications are easily handled; these
recommendations were largely based on price alone,
because comparator products were deemed equivalent
by CEDAC. As a result, price alone guided 60% of
CEDAC recommendations. In a few cases (including
one oncology drug), neither economic evidence nor
price was considered, because CEDAC was not con-
vinced of effectiveness, let alone cost-effectiveness.
Typically, CEDAC chose to reject a drug in the face of
clinical uncertainty.
For the submissions that appeared to consider
formal economic evidence beyond price, the economic
evidence that was submitted was frequently not helpful
to decision-making, because of faulty modeling and/or
overly optimistic assumptions of drug beneﬁt. Where
economic evidence seemed to be helpful, it was some-
times described in terms of whether or not the ICER
was attractive (without a deﬁnition of “attractive”).
This was true for both oncology medications and non-
oncology medications. Such bench-marking is not the
intended purpose of cost-effectiveness analysis, which
is to maximize outcomes subject to a budget con-
straint. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the concept
of an implicit threshold: where a drug has an “attrac-
tive” ICER, it is more likely to be positively recom-
mended, while a less attractive ICER is more likely to
be associated with a negative recommendation or at
best with a highly restricted positive recommendation.
Importantly, this implicit threshold did not act as a
clear demarcation line, because the ICER ranges for
medications with positive recommendations over-
lapped with the ICER ranges for medications with
negative recommendations. The resulting inconsis-
tency in what ICERs lead to a positive recommenda-
tion may be due to other factors considered in the
context of a speciﬁc review. Moreover, this inconsis-
tency was evident with respect to factors other than
economic ones. For example, historical precedence
was cited as a reason to list three medications that
were not thought to be cost-effective by CEDAC and
while this reason could have been invoked in numer-
ous other cases, it was not. Disease-free survival was
considered an acceptable outcome for one oncology
drug, but considered an unvalidated outcome for
another oncology drug. Inconsistency is not unique to
CEDAC but has been observed in a comparison of
decisions from Ontario, British Columbia, Australia,
and the United Kingdom’s NICE: “cost-effective medi-
cations are not always reimbursed, and . . . medica-
tions with poor cost-effectiveness are sometimes
reimbursed anyway [21]. The written recommenda-
tions suggest that the value of lambda was a moving
target depending on circumstance, and one of those
circumstances appears to be the disease of interest.
Oncology medications were recommended for listing
at the upper limit of accepted ICERs. ARVs at the
$50K/QALY mark were recommended for restricted
listing, and this benchmark was considered unattrac-
tive for other medications. Only one other nononcol-
ogy, non-ARV had a positive listing with a stated ICER
that was substantially more than $50K/QALY;
although described as “in excess of traditional stan-
dards,” it was found to be acceptable based on histori-
cal listing of comparators. Therefore, an implicit
threshold may be operational, and it may be at a
higher limit for oncology medications than for nonon-
cology medications; but any threshold seems to vary
by speciﬁc context.
The roundtable discussions provided yet another
perspective on reimbursement decision-making. The
experiences of the roundtable panelists support a com-
plexity of decision-making that contradicts the tempt-
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ingly simplistic adoption of an ICER threshold.
Indeed, narrowing the decision to a deﬁnition of
lambda was perceived as potentially dangerous, even
by the supporters of economic evidence. There was a
broad desire go beyond lambda to enhance the quality
and consistency of decisions. Panelists called for other
methods (Box 2): improved transparency of processes
and decisions; dynamic formularies, which can adapt
to evolving treatment practices and clinical data
(including the use of conditional listings and the ability
to withdraw products from a formulary), and expand-
ing the membership of review panels to provide differ-
ent types of expertise, ranging from health economists
and other methodologists to patients and the lay
public.
Two further issues were identiﬁed as critical to
the improvement of reimbursement decision-making.
First, there was recognition of the inevitable conﬂict in
values depending on the level of decision-making: the
macro-level (federal and provincial government agen-
cies and review boards) may adopt the societal per-
spective, the meso-level (hospitals) may adopt an
institutional perspective, and the micro-level (clini-
cians and patients) may adopt an individual perspec-
tive. Ethics and values differ substantially among these
levels depending on perspective, meaning that no one
decision is ethically “right” for all because obligations
to the patient, the institution, or the community can
conﬂict. To support the decision-maker and ensure the
acceptability of decisions, it is necessary to foster
transparency of decision-making, and to show that
all relevant considerations were taken into account.
Panelists repeatedly referenced Daniels and Sabin’s
“accountability for reasonableness” (A4R) ethical
decision-making framework as a means to better
ensure fairness and legitimacy of priority setting [41].
A4R has emerged as the leading framework for fair
priority setting [20]. There are four conditions of A4R
that, when satisﬁed, are thought to address the prob-
lems of distrust, legitimacy, and fairness that often face
health-care decision-makers: relevance, publicity, revi-
sions, and enforcement. These criteria are not consis-
tently perceived to be met in Canada, particularly
concerning the criterion of enforcement [42,43].
The other key issue was the lack of an explicit
weighting system for both evidence and values. High-
quality, consistent, defensible, and acceptable decisions
can be made only when they are consonant with an
explicitly stated hierarchy of evidence and values. This
does not currently exist in Canada. It was evident in
the published literature, the written reasons for recom-
mendation from CEDAC and in roundtable discus-
sions that decisions are complicated by the context,
and decision-makers struggle to assign consistent
weight to evidence and nonevidentiary factors. There
should be an opportunity to gather key participants
to develop a weighting system or criteria to assist
decision-makers for each of these domains. Patient and
lay public representatives are critical to this process;
they can and should be broadly involved throughout
the decision-making process [44]. This could result in
Canadian guidance for a context-sensitive lambda to
understand a hierarchy of clinical evidence, the man-
agement of uncertainty, and the acceptability of addi-
tional expenditures.
Canada is currently initiating a national process
for reimbursement decision-making in oncology; in
its ﬁrst year, participants are mandated to investigate
best practices for processes involved in this task. In
parallel, Canadian guidelines for the economic evalu-
ation of oncology medications are being developed,
to improve the quality of economic evidence in reim-
bursement submissions. This research indicates that
efforts should also be made to improve the criteria or
guidelines for the task of decision-making. Difﬁcult
resource allocation decisions need to be made that
incorporate more than clinical and economic evi-
dence, but also ethical considerations and noneviden-
tiary factors.
We wish to acknowledge the contributions of the roundtable
panelists, who offered us candid, insightful, and sincere
thoughts during our meeting. Participation as a panelist does
not imply agreement with the contents of this article: Rick
Box 2
Summary of roundtable recommendations
• Development of a weighting system for evidence
• Development of a weighting system for values
• Recognition and where possible resolution of the ethical conﬂicts involved in decision-making
• Improved transparency of processes and decisions
• Dynamic formularies, which can adapt to evolving treatment practices and clinical data (including the use
of conditional listings and the ability to withdraw products from a formulary)
• Expanded membership of review panels to provide different types of expertise, ranging from health
economists and other methodologists to patients and the lay public.
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